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The Recognition of Prosecutorial 
Obligations in an Era of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment 
and Over-representation of 
Aboriginal People in Prisons 
Marie Manikis* 
I. THE RISE OF MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES IN  
CANADA AND THEIR DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES IN  
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Mandatory minimum sentences in Canada have multiplied over the 
years and continue to rise.1 There are approximately 100 mandatory 
minimum sentences available in Canada2 and many more to be proposed in 
Parliament. This is a huge increase since the Supreme Court’s first decision 
on the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences in 1987, where 
only nine mandatory minimum sentences were included in legislation.  
Mandatory minimum sentences have had detrimental effects on the 
criminal justice process, including on the principle of proportionality at 
sentencing, as well as the over-representation of Aboriginal people in 
prisons. Indeed, it has contributed to the erosion of the principle of 
proportionality3 of sentences by making it impossible for judges to fully 
                                                                                                                                  
*  Faculty of Law, McGill University. I would like to thank Benjamin Berger and the 
organizers of the 2014 Osgoode Hall Constitutional Cases Conference for providing an opportunity 
to discuss this important issue. Many thanks to Palma Paciocco for previous discussions in this area, 
as well as Lisa Kerr, Hamish Stewart, Patrick Healy and Suzan Fraser for their input on this panel. 
1  R. v. Anderson, [2014] S.C.J. No. 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Anderson”]. 
2  Debra Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s Minimal Impact on Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences” in B.L. Berger, J. Stribopoulos, eds. (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 149, at 149. 
3  The importance of proportionate sentences has been recognized as a leading principle in 
many jurisdictions, including Canada, England and Wales and the United States. According to this 
principle, a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the level of 
blameworthiness of the offender (see s. 718.1 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46). It is worth 
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account for mitigating factors in cases where that would require judges to 
go below these mandatory minimums. A section 12 Charter4 challenge 
declaring the provision creating the mandatory minimum unconstitutional 
would be an appropriate solution, but the courts have repeatedly 
highlighted that the standard to meet for a provision that gives rise to cruel 
and unusual punishment is one of gross disproportionality, which makes 
this challenge very difficult.5  
In a recent and very thoughtful piece written by Paciocco,6 the author 
highlights the clear disconnect between the required proportionality 
standard in sentencing as a principle of fundamental justice protected 
under section 7, and the higher standard of gross disproportionality 
required for section 12 challenges, including challenges of mandatory 
minimum provisions. These disconnects will indeed affect the principle 
of proportionality and give rise to constitutional inconsistencies by 
maintaining a regime of disproportionate sentences due to the higher 
standard required under section 12. Paciocco rightfully argues in favour 
of a less stringent standard for the section 12 analysis that is closer to the 
regular proportionality analysis protected under section 7. 
In addition to eroding principles of sentencing as well as creating 
constitutional inconsistencies, mandatory minimum regimes have also 
given rise to legislative inconsistencies and contradictions with the 
legislative provisions related to mitigating factors. Indeed, section 718.2(a) 
mandates sentencing judges to take into consideration mitigating 
                                                                                                             
noting that the Canadian concept of proportionality has been interpreted in a more flexible and open-
ended fashion than its traditional definition by expanding the concept of mitigating factors to include 
elements that are not directly linked to the gravity of the offence and the level of blameworthiness of 
the offender in relation to the crime itself. For instance, it has been expanded to include elements 
related to the offender’s background, despite its less evident connection to the offence. (See R. v. 
Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”] with its analysis 
in Philip Stenning & Julian V. Roberts, “Empty Promises: Parliament, The Supreme Court, and the 
Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders” (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev. 137; R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, 
[2012] 1 S.C.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”], as well as state abuses (see e.g., R. v. 
Nasogaluak, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, 2010 1 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.).) This area of research on 
proportionality merits further time and space and thus will be left for another day. 
4  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
5  See R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morrisey, 
[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.); R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15 
[hereinafter “Nur”]. More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in Nur did not revise its stringent 
standard in order to provide consistency with the standard required for proportionality as a principle 
of fundamental justice under s. 7. 
6  Palma Paciocco, “Proportionality, Discretion, and the Roles of Judges and Prosecutors at 
Sentencing” (2014) 18 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 241. 
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circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. With the presence 
of mandatory minimums, judges lose their ability to weigh in these 
factors in the event that including them in the quantum of the sentence 
would result in a sentence that goes below the mandatory minimum. 
A particular and greater cause for concern that will be addressed in this 
article is the inconsistency between the mandatory nature of mandatory 
minimum sentences of imprisonment and the legislative duty under section 
718.2(e) that mandates sentencing judges to pay particular attention to the 
unique background of Aboriginals during sentencing, in order to accurately 
assess their level of blameworthiness in the context of proportionality and 
consider alternatives to imprisonment. This duty was enacted to address 
the national crisis of over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in Canada, 
which continues to grow.7 For instance, in 2010-2011, while forming only 
11.9 per cent of the overall population in Saskatchewan, Aboriginal 
offenders represented 77.6 per cent of the prison population.8 In this same 
period, in Manitoba, while Aboriginal people constituted 12.9 per cent of 
the overall population, they nevertheless represented 69.1 per cent of the 
prison population. In Ontario, Aboriginals form 1.8 per cent of the 
population and 11.4 per cent of the prison population. Finally in Quebec, 
while Aboriginal people form 1.3 per cent of the population, they represent 
4.4 per cent of the prison population. It is worth noting that percentages of 
Aboriginal offenders in custody may be even higher, since these statistics 
exclude admissions to custody in which Aboriginal identity was unknown.  
Indeed, section 718.2(e) requires judges to consider Aboriginal status 
and take into account this relevant background as an element that can 
diminish the level of blameworthiness of the offender and ultimately affect 
the quantum and nature of the sentence. The Supreme Court in Gladue9 
and more recently in Ipeelee10 has made clear that section 718.2(e) is a 
remedial provision that mandates a different framework of analysis for 
                                                                                                                                  
7  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “What We Have Learned: Principles of 
Truth and Reconciliation” (Winnipeg: the Commission, 2015), at 110. This report highlighted that 
nationally, by 2011-2012, 28 per cent of all admissions to sentenced custody were formed by 
Aboriginal people, while they make up only 4 per cent of the Canadian adult population. The over-
incarceration of women is even more disproportionate: 43 per cent of admissions of women to 
sentenced custody were Aboriginal. 
8  Statistics Canada, “Aboriginal adult admissions to custody, by province and territory, 
2010/2011”, Juristat (2012), online: Statcan.gc.ca <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/ 
article/11715/c-g/desc/desc07-eng.htm>. 
9  Gladue, supra, note 3. 
10  Ipeelee, supra, note 3. 
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sentencing Aboriginal offenders, taking into account “the distinct situation 
of Aboriginal peoples in Canada” including:  
(1) the unique systemic or background factors which may have played 
a part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the 
courts; and 
(2) the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be 
appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or 
her particular aboriginal heritage or connection. 
Hence, this duty imparts upon sentencing judges a duty to consider 
the offender’s background, particularly their Aboriginal status, prior to 
sentencing. If in light of the offender’s background, his or her level of 
blameworthiness is diminished, this background can be considered a 
factor that will affect the sentence and as much as possible help to 
consider alternative sanctions to imprisonment. As reiterated in Ipeelee, 
“the Gladue approach does not amount to reverse discrimination but is, 
rather, an acknowledgment that to achieve real equity, sometimes 
different people must be treated differently”.11 In the event that this duty 
is ignored, a party can appeal the sentence. This framework will be 
referred to as the Gladue principle or framework throughout this article. 
Despite this legislative duty, the presence of mandatory minimum 
sentences does not allow for judges to find alternatives to incarceration or 
go below the legislated minimum — effectively denying judges the ability 
to adequately take into account specific background as a mitigating factor. 
This remains a severe problem, since the impact of mandatory minimum 
sentences on Aboriginal people in Canada has been particularly acute and 
has been a direct cause for their over-representation in Canadian prisons.12 
These provisions are in direct conflict with one another and therefore 
cannot logically coexist within a coherent and principled sentencing 
                                                                                                                                  
11  United States of America v. Leonard, [2012] O.J. No. 4366, at para. 52, 2012 ONCA 622 
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 490 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Leonard”], 
citing Ipeelee, supra, note 3, at para. 71. 
12  For example, research has highlighted the severe impact of mandatory minimum 
sentences on the problem of over-incarceration of Aboriginal people in prisons. See, e.g., Larry N. 
Chartrand, “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 449; Ryan 
Newell, “Making Matters Worse: The Safe Streets and Communities Act and the Ongoing Crisis of 
Indigenous Over-Incarceration” (2013) 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 199. Further, based on similar findings, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “Calls to action” (Winnipeg: the Commission, 
2015), at 3 recommended in its recent report that amendments are brought to the Criminal Code to 
allow trial judges, upon giving reasons, to depart from mandatory minimum sentences and 
restrictions on the use of conditional sentences. 
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regime. For these reasons, this article suggests that Gladue should be 
expanded and also apply beyond sentencing judges to prosecutors. 
II. MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO 
PROSECUTORS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
A notable consequence of mandatory minimum sentences that is central 
to the main argument of this article is the degree of power that they transfer 
to prosecutors with regards to sentencing. Indeed, in many ways, while 
judicial discretion is limited by mandatory minimum sentences, conversely, 
prosecutors are placed in a position where they are given a wide and almost 
unfettered discretion to trigger these mandatory minimums that can 
ultimately affect the sentence. Prosecutors can trigger them in many ways, 
including by charging crimes that carry those sentences, by refusing to 
accept guilty pleas to lesser offences that do not carry mandatory 
minimums, by electing to proceed by indictment (rather than by summary 
proceedings) where that election entails a particular mandatory minimum, 
or by sending appropriate notice of an intention to seek greater punishment 
prior to any plea by reason of previous convictions.13 In light of this 
particular context, defendants have been creative in trying to find ways to 
have prosecutors take into account Aboriginal status and proportionality by 
increasing oversight by the judiciary. As recently shown in Anderson, 
constitutional arguments have been unsuccessful. 
In the case of Anderson, Anderson, an Aboriginal person, was 
charged with impaired driving under section 253 of the Criminal Code. 
This provided the prosecutor with the discretion under section 255 to 
trigger a mandatory minimum sentence in cases of previous convictions, 
by notifying the accused of its intention to seek greater punishment prior 
to any plea.14 The Crown filed the appropriate Notice to the accused of 
its intention to seek a greater punishment by reason of the accused’s four 
previous impaired driving convictions. This triggered a mandatory 
minimum sentence of not less than 120 days’ imprisonment.  
The Crown policy manual in Newfoundland and Labrador, to which 
the prosecutor presumably referred to, directs Crown Attorneys to 
                                                                                                                                  
13  See e.g., Anderson, supra, note 1. Mirko Bagaric, “Proportionality in Sentencing: its 
Justification, Meaning and Role” (2000) 12 Current Issues Crim. Just. 143. 
14  Criminal Code, ss. 255(1)(a)(iii) and 721(1). 
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request greater punishment under section 255 except in certain cases.  
It also states that prosecutors may exercise their discretion not to pursue 
an enhanced penalty, if all the prior convictions occurred more than  
five years before the current offence, as was the case for Anderson. The 
policy then lists a list of factors for Crown to consider when making this 
discretionary decision, but does not explicitly mention Aboriginal status. 
In this situation, before sentencing, Anderson challenged section 255 and 
section 727(1), arguing that Crown prosecutors were constitutionally 
required under section 7 to consider the Aboriginal status of the accused 
when making decisions that limit the sentencing options available to 
judges, in this case in the context of a mandatory minimum. More 
specifically, the argument highlighted that the principle of proportionality 
of sentences was a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the 
Charter and this principle also applied to prosecutors in a context where a 
provision (in this case mandatory minimums) reduced the sentencing 
options available to judges in the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders.15 The 
Crown argued that there was no such obligation and that the terms “the 
background and circumstances of the offender” included Aboriginal status. 
The Provincial Court of Newfoundland and Labrador accepted 
Anderson’s argument and highlighted that in order to ensure compliance 
with section 7, the Crown must in all cases, including those involving 
non-Aboriginal offenders, provide justification for relying on the Notice. 
Having determined that he was not bound by the mandatory minimum, 
the judge sentenced Anderson to a 90-day intermittent sentence followed 
by two years’ probation and a five-year driving prohibition. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal rejected the Crown’s appeal and all 
members of the Court held that where the Crown tenders the Notice at 
the sentencing hearing without considering the accused’s Aboriginal 
status, this renders the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair, leading 
to a section 7 breach. Interestingly, the Court noted that there would not 
be a breach of section 7 if the Crown’s policy manual regarding the 
decision to tender the Notice included a specific direction to consider the 
offender’s Aboriginal status. The fact that it referred to the “background 
and circumstances of the offender” was not sufficient, and therefore the 
lack of clear direction, coupled with the lack of explanation on the part of 
                                                                                                                                  
15  Mr. Anderson also argued that the statutory scheme violated s. 15(1) of the Charter 
because it deprived an Aboriginal person of the opportunity to argue for a non-custodial sentence in 
an appropriate case. Although this argument was accepted by the Provincial Court of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, it was not presented at the higher instances. 
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the Crown for its decision to tender the Notice in this case, led the Court 
to conclude that section 7 of the Charter had been breached.  
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with these judgments. Despite 
the real effect of mandatory minimum sentences transferring sentencing 
powers to prosecutors, the Court made clear on the constitutional question 
that prosecutors have no constitutional duty under section 7 of the Charter16 
to consider Aboriginal status when making decisions that would trigger 
mandatory minimum sentences and reduce judicial sentencing options.  
First, it emphasized that the role of prosecutors is distinct from the 
role of judges and that there is no legal basis to support their equating 
roles in the sentencing process. To preserve the division of functions, it 
made clear that “it is the judge’s responsibility, within the applicable 
legal parameters, to craft a proportionate sentence. If a mandatory 
minimum regime requires a judge to impose a disproportionate sentence, 
the regime should be challenged.”17  
Second, the Court found that the claim that prosecutors must consider 
the Aboriginal status of the accused prior to making decisions that limit a 
judge’s sentencing options does not meet the test that governs principles of 
fundamental justice,18 more specifically the second requirement that 
requires popular consensus that the principle is fundamental to the way in 
which the legal system ought to fairly operate. It highlighted that 
recognizing such a principle would instead be contrary to the long-
standing and deeply rooted division of responsibility between the Crown 
prosecutor and courts by expanding the scope of judicial review.  
Rooting its decision in the division of responsibility between the 
Crown prosecutors and judges, it is clear that the major concern behind 
the Court’s decision is the resistance towards increasing judicial 
oversight of prosecutorial decisions. Indeed, the Court concluded: 
The principle advanced by the accused does not meet the second 
requirement as it is contrary to a long-standing and deeply-rooted approach 
to the division of responsibility between the Crown prosecutor and the 
courts. It would greatly expand the scope of judicial review of discretionary 
                                                                                                                                  
16  Charter, supra, note 4. 
17  Anderson, supra, note 1, at para. 25 (emphasis in original).  
18  This test was reiterated in R. v. B. (D.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
which stated at para. 46 that in order to be recognized as a principle of fundamental justice, a 
principle must (1) be a legal principle; (2) enjoy consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental 
to the way in which the legal system ought to fairly operate and (3) be identified with sufficient 
precision to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or 
security of the person. 
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decisions made by prosecutors and put at risk the adversarial nature of our 
criminal justice system by inviting judicial oversight of the numerous 
decisions that Crown prosecutors make on a daily basis.19 
Having ruled on the constitutional question, it then concluded that the 
decision to tender the Notice is part of the wide category of prosecutorial 
discretion, which cannot be reviewed unless there is evidence of abuse of 
process. 
III. THE QUASI-ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CANADA 
The conclusion in Anderson on the constitutional question is not 
surprising considering the wider Canadian trend towards protecting 
prosecutorial power and decision-making from judicial oversight. 
Indeed, if the Court had recognized proportionality as a constitutional 
principle of fundamental justice that applies to prosecutors, it would have 
extended judicial oversight by allowing Charter challenges to various 
ways by which prosecutors can trigger mandatory minimums. More 
specifically, it would have required that prosecutors disclose the reasons 
behind their decisions and consider the defendant’s Aboriginal status 
prior to triggering a mandatory minimum. Judges would have been able 
to oversee this prosecutorial decision to make sure it conformed to the 
Charter and enabled appropriate remedies in case of breach. Further, a 
lower standard of review would have been applicable than the abuse of 
process doctrine.  
The vast majority of prosecutorial decisions are part of what is 
recognized as “prosecutorial discretion”. These decisions, which are not 
considered to be governed by the Charter and are not considered as “tactics 
or conduct before the court”, remain almost unfettered by the judiciary.20 
                                                                                                                                  
19  Anderson, supra, note 1, headnote. 
20  See R. v. Boucher, [1954] S.C.J. No. 54, 1955 S.C.R. 16, at 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Boucher”]; More recently, in Anderson, supra, note 1, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized 
two forms of prosecutorial powers, namely exercises of prosecutorial discretion and tactics/conduct 
before the court. Prosecutorial discretion, is defined as an expansive term that covers all “decisions 
regarding the nature and extent of the prosecution and the Attorney General’s participation in it” 
(Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, at para. 47, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Krieger”]). Although not exhaustive, this includes a number of influential decisions, 
including the decisions to prosecute a charge laid by the police, enter a stay of proceedings in private 
and public prosecutions, accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge, withdraw from criminal proceedings 
altogether and take control of a private prosecution. This also includes the decisions to enter into and 
repudiate plea agreements as seen in R. v. Nixon, 2011 S.C.J. No. 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Nixon”] and can only be reviewed in exceptional circumstances where there is abuse of 
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In common law jurisdictions, as a vestige of the principle of Crown 
immunity and concepts such as “the King can do no wrong”, prosecutorial 
discretion has historically been heavily protected from judicial oversight. 
While some common law jurisdictions have recognized greater room for 
oversight, Canada has largely managed to insulate prosecutorial decisions 
from oversight with some exceptions, notably with the recognition of 
Charter obligations.  
Indeed, the Charter contributed to some additional judicial oversight in 
areas of traditionally unfettered prosecutorial discretion — most notably in 
the area of prosecutorial disclosure of evidence to the accused.21  
Despite this opening, the Supreme Court has recently strengthened 
its protection of prosecutorial discretion, confirming its largely insulated 
function in the name of prosecutorial independence.22 This shielded 
power enables prosecutors to make a number of decisions about the 
course of proceedings without having to provide any explanation or 
being routinely second-guessed — effectively isolating prosecutors from 
review by any other body, unless the doctrine of abuse of process can be 
successfully invoked, which remains a very difficult standard to meet.23 
The standard of review required to show abuse of process in such cases 
                                                                                                             
process. The category of “tactics or conduct before the court” includes “such decisions are governed 
by the inherent jurisdiction of the court to control its own processes once the Attorney General has 
elected to enter into that forum” (Krieger, id., at para. 47). Hence, it relates to ensuring that the 
machinery of the court functions in an orderly and effective manner. 
21  See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.). 
22  In addition to Anderson, recent cases have also reaffirmed the tendency towards the 
immunization of prosecutorial decisions by suggesting that the abuse of process doctrine should only 
be found in very exceptional circumstances; see, e.g., Nixon, supra, note 20. Also, see the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in R. v. Bérubé, [2012] B.C.J. No. 1705, 2012 BCCA 345 (B.C.C.A.), in which a 
plea agreement between the Crown and defence was repudiated due to the prosecutor’s error, which 
was prejudicial to the defendant, but was not considered to meet the necessary egregiousness 
required for it to be considered an abuse of process. Further, even when an abuse of process by the 
Crown is found, the remedies attached to this are limited. For instance, in R. v. Babos, [2014] S.C.J. 
No. 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) the Court decided that a Crown who makes threats intended to 
bully an accused into foregoing his or her right to trial was a betrayal of her role as a Crown, 
reprehensible and unworthy of the dignity of her offices. Despite finding an abuse of process, the 
majority found that the remedy of a stay of proceedings was not appropriate since the seriousness of 
the misconduct needs to be weighed against the societal interest in having a trial.  
23  See Boucher, supra, note 20; more recently, in Anderson, supra, note 1. The abuse of 
process doctrine is available where there is evidence that the prosecutor’s conduct is egregious and 
seriously compromises trial fairness or the integrity of the justice system. The burden of proof lies on 
the accused to establish, on a balance of probabilities, a proper evidentiary foundation to proceed with 
an abuse of process claim, before requiring the Crown to provide reasons justifying its decision. Hence, 
where a claimant establishes a proper evidentiary foundation for an abuse of process claim, the 
evidentiary burden may shift to the Crown, who will be obliged to provide explanations for its decision. 
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is very high and has generally only been met in a minority of cases.24 
Indeed, abuse of process refers to conduct that is egregious and seriously 
compromises trial fairness and/or the integrity of the system. Further, 
more restrictions were announced in Anderson in terms of evidentiary 
burdens. In addition to the long-established onus on the accused to prove 
an abuse on a balance of probabilities, Stuart deplores the fact that even 
less transparency is required, since “the defence now also has an 
evidentiary burden to meet before the Crown has to give reasons for the 
exercise of its discretion”25 when it alleges an abuse of power.  
Hence, since there is a trend towards isolating prosecutorial decisions 
and ensuring that they remain one of the least transparent and most 
unfettered powers in this country, it is no surprise that the recognition of a 
prosecutorial obligation that would have opened the door to more judicial 
oversight of prosecutorial decisions was rejected.  
Interestingly, however, in the recent case of Nur,26 the majority of the 
Supreme Court of Canada does not explicitly disagree with the minority’s 
conception of abuse of discretion even though it highlights that it remains 
a notoriously high bar. Justice Moldaver’s minority judgment highlighted 
that the abuse of process doctrine should not be exceptional. It made clear 
that “[a]buse of process is typically characterized by intentional 
misconduct or bad faith”,27 but cites Babos28 to suggest that situations may 
arise where the integrity of the justice system can be affected in the 
absence of misconduct. This includes situations where a prosecutor 
decides to proceed by indictment in order to use the threat of a mandatory 
minimum to extort a guilty plea, as well as situations where Crown 
election was influenced by discriminatory factors such as the race of the 
offender.29 This recent decision might suggest more openness to changing 
the rigid definition of “abuse of process” in order to facilitate prosecutorial 
accountability, if not under section 12, perhaps under section 7. Despite  
 
                                                                                                                                  
24  See, e.g., Krieger, supra, note 20; Nixon, supra, note 20; R. v. Power, [1994] S.C.J. No. 29, 
1994 1 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.). These cases include generally situations where there has been a 
“flagrant impropriety” (Krieger, id., at para. 49); the prosecutor acted “dishonestly”, in “bad faith”, 
“undermines the integrity of the judicial process”; for an “improper purpose” or with a lack of 
“objectivity”; or the misconduct amounted to an “abuse of process”. 
25  Don Stuart, “Anderson: Continuing a Questionable March to Legal Immunity for Crown 
Attorneys” (2014) 11 C.R. (7th) 26. 
26  Supra, note 5. 
27  Id., para. 164. 
28  Supra, note 22. 
29  Nur, supra, note 5, at paras. 168-169. 
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this noteworthy decision, it remains unclear whether courts will generally 
continue to recognize abuse of process in situations where there is 
intentional misconduct or bad faith.  
IV. THE RATIONALES OF GLADUE AS A STAND-ALONE PRINCIPLE 
THAT EXPANDS TO PROSECUTORS 
Following Anderson, can prosecutors ignore proportionality and 
Aboriginal status when their decisions limit sentencing options by 
triggering mandatory minimums? In Anderson, the Court found that there 
was no constitutional duty that imparts on prosecutors to consider 
proportionality and Aboriginal status, but did not explicitly address 
whether another type of duty may exist. The following section argues 
that prosecutors should have, at minimum, an ethical duty to consider 
Aboriginal status in light of Gladue as an arguably stand-alone principle 
that should also apply to prosecutors. Failing to respect this principle 
should be treated as an abuse of process, as defined in Nur that would 
give rise to adequate remedies.  
Further, it rejects Paciocco’s contention that the principle of 
proportionality in sentencing necessarily comprises the Gladue principle. 
Instead, it suggests that the consideration of Aboriginal status and 
contextual background, known as the Gladue principle, is different from 
the principle of proportionality, since its primary objective is to tackle 
systemic discrimination against Aboriginal people and their over-
representation in Canadian prisons.  
Despite this view, this piece partially relies on Paciocco’s argument 
that prosecutors must consider Aboriginal status in their decisions, as 
part of their role as “ministers of justice”. This argument however, is 
based on the Gladue rationale rather than the theory of proportionality at 
sentencing. Indeed, it argues that even if Gladue and the theory of 
proportionality were not recognized as constitutional duties that apply to 
prosecutors, prosecutors nevertheless have an ethical duty to consider 
Aboriginal status when triggering mandatory minimum sentences. 
Hence, it outlines how the role of prosecutors as ministers of justice fits 
with the consideration of Aboriginal background in light of the national 
crisis of Aboriginal over-incarceration.  
In this respect, all decision-makers that can affect the liberty interests 
of Aboriginal people should consider Gladue principles, particularly 
prosecutors, considering their impact on these interests, as well as their 
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historical contribution to the over-representation of Aboriginal people in 
prisons.  
Finally, having examined the different prosecutorial guidelines, this 
section argues that the current Canadian context is unsatisfactory, since 
Aboriginal background is generally not explicitly accounted for in these 
guidelines. It argues in favour of the recognition of such explicit duties in 
prosecutorial guidelines and reflects on the enforcement of these duties by 
proposing a possible remedial mechanism that can respond to ethical 
breaches without resorting to additional judicial oversight of prosecutorial 
decisions, while increasing transparency and promoting understanding of 
prosecutorial decisions. 
1.  The Distinction between the Gladue Principle and the Principle 
of Proportionality 
As highlighted above, in order to reject the recognition of a 
constitutional duty for prosecutors to consider proportionality that includes 
consideration of Aboriginal status, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
distinctive functional roles between the judiciary and prosecutors, mainly 
to avoid judicial oversight. More specifically, it highlighted that 
proportionality and consideration of Aboriginal background was associated 
with the sentencing function which is a function performed by judges and 
not prosecutors. 
This stringent dichotomy related to the division of functions was 
criticized by Paciocco, who argued that if proportionality is to be taken 
seriously, Aboriginal background, which is part of proportionality, should 
not only be the exclusive responsibility of sentencing judges, but also 
applicable to prosecutors.30  
Contrary to Paciocco’s claim, the Supreme Court rightfully decided 
that prosecutors and judges have separate duties and that judges are the 
ones who are responsible for applying the principle of proportionality as 
part of their sentencing function. Indeed, the principle of proportionality 
that Anderson referred to is a principle that has been traditionally 
recognized in sentencing theory and practice, and has therefore been 
associated with that specific stage of the process implemented by judges.31 
                                                                                                                                  
30  Paciocco, supra, note 6. 
31  See s. 718.1 Criminal Code; Mirko Bagaric, “Proportionality in Sentencing: its Justification, 
Meaning and Role” (2000) 12 Current Issues Crim. Just. 143; Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth, 
Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) RECOGNITION OF PROSECUTORIAL OBLIGATIONS 289 
Proportionality is imbedded in notions of fairness and posits that the 
severity of the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence 
and to the level of blameworthiness of the offender. Since it is part of the 
sentencing process, judges are the ones responsible of the implementation 
of this principle even if its exact definition and breadth may vary between 
the different common law jurisdictions.32  
In Canada, elements of Gladue have been considered as a component 
of the principle of proportionality in sentencing, but it would be an error to 
equate Gladue to proportionality. Indeed, as highlighted earlier, it was made 
clear in Ipeelee that Aboriginal background can indeed affect a person’s 
level of moral blameworthiness and for this reason can effectively be 
considered as a mitigating factor within the proportionality framework.33 
However, the offender’s level of blameworthiness is merely one component 
of proportionality34 as well as the Gladue principle. Indeed, the Gladue 
principle’s rationale goes beyond merely considering the level of 
blameworthiness of the offender in sentencing, and actually serves a wider 
remedial purpose of reducing the overall Aboriginal prison population by 
recognizing the historical and current systemic discriminatory practices by 
state agencies against Aboriginal people that continue to plague the criminal 
justice process. In order to reach this important remedial objective,35 it will 
be shown below that this principle needs to be expanded beyond sentencing 
and recognized as a stand-alone principle that also applies to all decision-
making processes by criminal justice agencies that have the power to 
restrict an Aboriginal person’s liberty. 
Consequently, instead of relying on the theory of proportionality to 
argue in favour of considering Aboriginal background and status, it would 
have been more principled to argue Anderson in light of Gladue as a wider 
stand-alone principle that should apply to all actors of the criminal justice 
process, including prosecutors, when their actions and decisions limit the 
liberty interests of Aboriginal people. The next section argues in favour of  
 
                                                                                                                                  
32  Marie Manikis, “Decalibrating the scales of justice: prosecutorial discretion and mandatory 
sentences” (Criminal law conference, University of Ottawa, May 1, 2015); Further, in Canada, its 
application to the judiciary has been recognized as a principle of fundamental justice in several 
noteworthy decisions, including Ipeelee, supra, note 3, at para. 36; Anderson, supra, note 1, at para. 21. 
33  Ipeelee, id., at paras. 37-39, 73. 
34  In addition to the offender’s level of blameworthiness the gravity of the offence, 
measured by the level of harm is the other essential component of proportionality.  
35  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “Calls to action” (Winnipeg: the 
Commission, 2015), at 3. 
290 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
this expansion and suggests that if the rationales of Gladue and Ipeelee are 
to be taken seriously, this framework should also be taken into account by 
prosecutors as part of their role as ministers of justice when making 
decisions that can impact on the liberty of Aboriginal people, including the 
triggering of mandatory minimum sentences. 
2.  Expanding Gladue beyond Sentencing  
The national crisis of Aboriginal over-representation in Canada is in 
great part due to several actors in the justice process, and therefore special 
consideration to the unique circumstances and background of Aboriginal 
offenders should be taken into account by all the responsible agencies that 
have an impact on over-incarceration, which, as will be seen below, 
includes prosecutors. Adopting a mutually exclusive practice that only 
applies the Gladue framework to sentencing judges, would exacerbate the 
problem of Aboriginal over-representation and be contrary to the way in 
which our legal system ought to fairly operate. Since the over-
representation of Aboriginal offenders in prison is a systemic reality that 
involves the responsibility of different agencies, it makes sense that the 
ethos of Gladue should apply to all actors of the criminal justice system 
that may contribute to the over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders.36 
Further, in the wake of Gladue, Turpel-Lafond J. had also argued that if the 
analytical framework of Gladue were to have the desired effect, Crown 
counsel, defence counsel as well as the judiciary would all need to “adjust 
their practice to reflect the requirements of the decision”.37 This shared 
commitment seems fundamental to the way in which the legal system 
ought to fairly operate. 
Indeed, the Court in Gladue adequately highlighted that the duty to take 
into account the status of Aboriginal offenders is not only a requirement that 
applies to sentencing judges, but also to all decision-makers who have the 
power to influence the treatment of Aboriginal people in the justice system. 
In order to support this shared commitment and responsibility towards these 
principles, the Court referred to the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, 
which commissioned a great deal of research on the criminal justice system  
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
36  Stenning & Roberts, supra, note 3.  
37  M.E. Turpel-Lafond, “Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural 
Implications of R. v. Gladue” (1999) 43:1 Crim. L.Q. 34, at 37. 
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and Aboriginals, and found that Aboriginal over-representation in prison is  
attributable to a series of decisions by different actors of the criminal justice 
system. It noted:  
Aboriginal over-representation is the end point of a series of decisions 
made by those with decision-making power in the justice system. An 
examination of each of these decisions suggests that the way that 
decisions are made within the justice system discriminates against 
Aboriginal people in virtually every point.38 
In this respect, if the focus is merely on the sentencing process, 
Gladue’s aims and ethos will not be met. A widespread procedural 
adaptation would be needed that applies to all actors in the criminal justice 
system that can have an impact on the Aboriginal person’s freedoms, and 
this should be reflected in ethical duties and guideline manuals. 
Recently, in line with this rationale, the Court of Appeal of Ontario in 
Leonard,39 where leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court, 
illustrated a broader application of Gladue in a context where the 
Minister of Justice is given wide ministerial discretion. In this case, the 
Minister of Justice signed separate extradition surrender orders for two 
Aboriginal offenders for them to face trial in the United States on drug 
charges, where their Aboriginal background will not be taken into 
account in sentencing, and the mandatory minimums for the crimes 
committed would have been drastically longer than the sentences they 
would have faced in Canada. These individuals suffered from 
disadvantaged backgrounds caused by Canada’s history of discrimination 
and neglect in relation to Aboriginal people, including their membership 
to families that were survivors of the residential school system. As well, 
both came from homes where addictions of both drugs and alcohol were 
present from a very young age. The issue in this case was whether the 
Minister erred in law by failing to adequately consider the defendants’ 
Aboriginal status with respect to the Gladue principles when 
surrendering the defendants. It was decided that surrender in this case 
would be “unjust or oppressive” under section 44 of the Extradition Act40  
 
                                                                                                                                  
38  Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People. The 
Justice System and Aboriginal People: Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vol. 1 
(Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer, 1991) [hereinafter “Manitoba Inquiry”], chapter 4. See online: 
<http://www.ajic.mb.ca/volumel/chapter4.html>. 
39  Supra, note 11. 
40  S.C. 1999, c. 18. 
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and would “shock the conscience” under section 7 of the Charter. In this 
respect, the Court in Leonard made clear that Gladue principles not only 
apply to sentencing judges but also towards a multitude of situations 
where Aboriginal people generally “interact with the justice system”, 
including when a Minister of Justice exercises discretion and must 
consider the severity of the sentence the accused is likely to receive in 
each jurisdiction.41 Finally, it reminded that the Gladue factors are not 
limited to criminal sentencing by judges, but need to be considered by all 
“decision-makers who have the power to influence the treatment of 
aboriginal offenders in the criminal justice system”,42 as well as 
whenever an Aboriginal person’s liberty is at stake in criminal and 
related proceedings. 
Based on this rationale, it will be seen in greater depth below that 
prosecutors should also apply the Gladue framework since they are 
decision-makers who have the power to influence the treatment of 
Aboriginal offenders and can indeed contribute to their over-incarceration 
when making important decisions. Further, it will be seen below that this 
role also ties in with their role as ministers of justice. 
3.  The Consideration of Aboriginal Status as Part of the Role of 
Prosecutors as “Ministers of Justice” 
In common law jurisdictions, prosecutors have an important role to 
play as “ministers of justice” with a duty to ensure that the criminal justice 
system operates fairly towards all participants, including the accused, 
victims of crime and the public. Indeed, prosecutorial decisions should be 
made independently without any external pressure or influences, in an 
objective way — devoid of passions, emotions or prejudices — and with a 
lack of animus towards the suspect or the accused.  
Although prosecutors are part of an adversarial system and need to 
remain strong and effective advocates for the prosecution,43 as ministers 
of justice they must also perform a special function in ensuring that  
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
41  In this respect “Gladue clearly has a bearing on the question of the severity of the 
sentence the accused is likely to receive in each jurisdiction. Any reasonable evaluation of the 
severity of the likely sentence in each jurisdiction must take into account the possible effect of 
Gladue” (Leonard, id., note 11, at para. 84). 
42  Gladue, supra, note 3, at para. 65. 
43  R. v. Cook, [1997] S.C.J. No. 22, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1113 (S.C.C.). 
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justice is served, and for this reason cannot adopt a purely adversarial 
role towards the defence. The role of Crown counsel as advocates has 
historically been characterized as more a part of the court than an  
ordinary advocate, and therefore the Crown’s actions should be fair, 
dispassionate, and open to the possibility of the innocence of the accused 
while avoiding “tunnel vision”.44  
It has been highlighted numerous times in Canadian case law that the 
complex role of the prosecutor is not to win or lose, nor is it to seek the 
highest sentence possible — or indeed to pursue convictions, but rather 
to ensure that justice is done.45  
Crown counsel also have a responsibility to ensure that every 
prosecution is carried out in a manner consistent with the public interest. 
An aspect of this duty that needs to be highlighted is the leadership role 
that Crown counsel has, as a key participant in the criminal justice 
system, to work towards overcoming any forms of discrimination and 
ensuring that the various forms of discrimination are not reflected in the 
criminal justice system.  
As part of this role, prosecutors have an important role to play in 
remedying the national crisis of Aboriginal over-representation in 
Canadian prisons that is a result of systemic discriminatory practices at 
different stages of the criminal justice process, not merely sentencing. For 
these reasons, prosecutors should pay particular attention to Aboriginal 
background and thus apply the principles developed in Gladue.  
Further, research has shown that prosecutors have also contributed to 
the systemic problem of Aboriginal over-representation in Canadian 
prisons. For instance, the aforementioned Manitoba Inquiry found that in 
a similar context, Aboriginal accused are more likely to be charged with 
multiple offences than are non-Aboriginal accused. It further concluded 
that “the over-representation of Aboriginal people occurs at virtually 
every step of the judicial process, from the charging of individuals to 
their sentencing.”46 
                                                                                                                                  
44  The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, The Hon. Fred Kaufman, 
Commissioner (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1998), at 1136. 
45  Boucher, supra, note 20. 
46  Manitoba Inquiry, supra, note 38, ch. 4, the over-representation of Aboriginal people 
occurs at virtually every step of the judicial process, from the charging of individuals to their 
sentencing. 
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Similarly, the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr, 
Prosecution concluded that: 
Donald Marshall, Jr’s status as a Native contributed to the miscarriage of 
justice that has plagued him since 1971. We believe that certain persons 
within the system would have been more rigorous in their duties, more 
careful, or more conscious of fairness if Marshall had been white.47 
Some scholars have even argued that the issue of over-representation 
is not attributable to sentencing judges, but rather the result of prior 
decisions taken by other criminal justice agencies — including prosecutors 
and police — and therefore creative remedial solutions should be taken 
within those agencies.48 
Indeed, the need to exercise prosecutorial duties with greater rigour, 
care and consciousness in the context of Aboriginal people should be 
implemented by ensuring that special consideration of Aboriginal status 
should expand to prosecutors. Considering that their actions and decisions 
heavily influence sentencing options and outcomes, particularly when 
triggering mandatory minimums, and have indeed directly contributed to 
Aboriginal over-representation in prisons, ethical duties in relation to 
Aboriginal offenders should be made explicitly clear as a reminder for 
prosecutors. Further, in many of their decisions, they are called upon to 
consider the “public interest”, notably by considering factors that relate to 
the offender’s background. In this context, the consideration of Aboriginal 
status and background in prosecutorial decision-making should explicitly 
be included as an additional reminder of the importance of this shared 
responsibility towards reducing discriminatory practices that have resulted 
in the over-representation of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons.  
Finally, failure to pay special attention to Aboriginal status should 
arguably be considered an abuse of process as defined by Moldaver J. in 
Nur, regardless of whether this failure is intentional or not. Indeed, as seen 
in Nur and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Anderson, Crown 
decisions, including Crown elections, motivated by prejudice against 
Aboriginal persons would certainly meet the standard of abuse of process 
by the Crown. A parallel can be made between this statement and the 
failure to apply the Gladue framework in prosecutorial decisions. Indeed, 
the failure to take into account the history and background of Aboriginal 
                                                                                                                                  
47  Nova Scotia, The Marshall Inquiry: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr, 
Prosecution, Digest of Findings and Recommendations 1989 (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 
1989), at 162. 
48  Stenning & Roberts, supra, note 3. 
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people would contribute to further decontextualized and discriminatory 
practices, as well as imprisonment, which is arguably prejudicial to 
Aboriginal persons and thus would be considered an abuse of process by 
the Crown that would compromise trial fairness and/or the integrity of the 
justice system.  
In brief, since prosecutorial decisions, particularly in the context of 
mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment, can have an important 
impact on the ultimate sentencing outcome, it would be important for 
prosecutors to bear in mind their responsibility towards making their 
decisions as fair as possible by including guidance found within the Gladue 
framework. Indeed, their role fits well within the Gladue framework, which 
finds roots in the concepts of equality, fairness and restraint. Based on  
this account, it would also fall within the purview of prosecutors to  
consider elements within the framework of Gladue, including moral 
blameworthiness, but also the historical and contextual background of 
Aboriginal people, as well as the context of systemic discrimination and its 
effect on moral blameworthiness of these individuals. 
V. A PRELIMINARY WAY FORWARD: THE RECOGNITION OF  
ETHICAL DUTIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY AS PART OF 
PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES 
1.  Prosecutorial Guidelines and the Need for Reform 
The current state of ethical duties that imparts on prosecutors to 
consider Aboriginal status is arguably unsatisfactory. Prosecutorial 
guidelines available in each province and at the federal level were 
analyzed to determine the extent to which Aboriginal status of defendants 
should have been taken into account during prosecutorial decision-
making. The guidelines revealed that in general, there are no explicit 
requirements for prosecutors to consider the Aboriginal status of 
defendants for most decisions. Ontario and Nova Scotia remain the 
exception by indicating that prosecutors should consider the unique and 
systemic or background factors that may have contributed to an 
Aboriginal person’s criminal conduct, as well as relevant sanctions.49  
                                                                                                                                  
49  Ministry of the Attorney General, Crown Policy Manual (Toronto: Government of 
Ontario, 2005); Nova Scotia has a separate administrative policy for Aboriginal cases which ensures 
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A partial recognition that remains insufficient can be found in some 
guidelines in which prosecutors are directed to consider Aboriginal status 
for very specific types of offences, namely for sentencing impaired 
driving50 or domestic violence cases.51 A notable feature that is worth 
mentioning is that most provinces in the Prairies, where the issue of 
Aboriginal over-representation in prisons is the most acute, Aboriginal 
status is either rarely mentioned or not mentioned at all.52 Further, some 
provinces refer to other mentioned criteria, such as the accused’s 
background,53 but as highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Anderson, an 
explicit directive should be included that instructs prosecutors to 
specifically take into account the offender’s Aboriginal status.54 A general 
reference to background, or state, without explicitly referring to Aboriginal 
background is vague and remains insufficient. Due to the unique status of 
Aboriginal offenders, clear and explicit instructions need to be drafted. 
Finally, it is well worth mentioning that Quebec fails to mention Aboriginal 
status as a relevant factor to consider for any prosecutorial decisions.  
In addition to the fact that explicit mention of Aboriginal background 
consideration is generally lacking, there are also considerable 
inconsistencies and variations between the different provinces, which adds 
to the unsatisfactory state of ethical duties within the national scene. In light 
of the reality of Aboriginal over-representation in prisons and the partial role 
that prosecutors have played in this reality, it would be in the public interest 
to have generally uniform prosecution policies applicable across the country.  
2.  A Possible Road towards Greater Transparency and 
Accountability 
Paciocco highlighted that one of the issues with ethical duties is that 
they are difficult to enforce and do not necessarily entail remedies for 
                                                                                                             
that the appropriate level of prosecutor expertise in Aboriginal issues is met, and has established an 
Aboriginal Law Working Group. 
50  Department of Justice, Federal Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa: 
Government of Canada, 2014) [hereinafter “Federal guideline”].  
51  The Federal guideline, as well as prosecutorial guidelines in Prince Edward Island and in 
Newfoundland and Labrador, only refer to the status of Aboriginals for cases of domestic violence. 
52  For instance, the Manitoba Prosecution Policies only refer to Aboriginal status in 
decisions to use extra-judicial measures in a particular case; in Saskatchewan, there are no references 
to a person’s Aboriginal status. 
53  These provinces include Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Prince 
Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador.  
54  This argument was interestingly addressed by the Court of Appeal of Ontario in Anderson. 
(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) RECOGNITION OF PROSECUTORIAL OBLIGATIONS 297 
individuals who are affected by ethical breaches.55 Indeed, the lack of 
remedies traditionally associated with ethical duties is one of the reasons 
complainants may be tempted to have some of their interests recognized 
as legally enforceable rights. A possible way forward that does not 
involve expansive judicial oversight may be found in the experience of 
other common law jurisdictions that have elaborated administrative 
processes for reviewing certain prosecutorial decisions.  
A notable and recent example can be found in England and Wales 
where a right to review has been recognized for victims of crime who 
may want to challenge prosecutorial decisions, including the decision not 
to prosecute and the decision to stop a prosecution. Indeed, in 2011, the 
Court of Appeal in Killick56 recognized the right of a victim to seek a 
review of a Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) decision not to 
prosecute. In light of this judgment, the CPS launched guidelines for the 
Victims’ Rights to Review Scheme which makes it possible for victims to 
seek a review of a CPS decision not to bring charges or to terminate all 
proceedings.57 This mechanism has recently recognized that victims can 
also play a crucial role in ensuring that prosecutorial decisions are 
explained and are also reviewed in cases of error.  
First, this mechanism requires prosecutors to explicitly motivate their 
decisions to complainants. This act of transparency seems like a greater way 
to increase public confidence without interfering with prosecutorial 
independence. Indeed, as recommended by Justice Rosenberg a few years 
ago, in order to increase legitimacy and understanding of the process, 
prosecutorial decisions should be supported as much as possible with 
explicit explanations of the rationales behind their decisions.58 This process 
does not disturb prosecutorial safeguards since it does not involve judicial 
oversight and enables greater transparency and understanding of 
prosecutorial decision-making by requiring prosecutors to provide interested 
parties with motives and explanations for reaching a specific decision.  
Second, and more controversially, this mechanism enables 
complainants to seek review of specific prosecutorial decisions. This 
right to review recognizes that during prosecutorial decision-making, 
                                                                                                                                  
55  Paciocco, supra, note 6. 
56  R. v. Killick, [2011] EWCA Crim. 1608 (C.A.). 
57  The Crown Prosecution Service, United Kingdom Government, “Victims’ Right to 
Review Scheme” (2014), online: Crown Prosecution Service <http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_ 
witnesses/victims_right_to_review/>. 
58  The Honourable Marc Rosenberg, “The Attorney General and the Prosecution Function 
on the Twenty-First Century” (2009) 43 Queen’s L.J. 813. 
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errors can occur. In this respect, interested parties can seek to obtain an 
entirely fresh examination of all the evidence and circumstances of a 
case, and if an error was made, the mistake will be redressed. The 
mechanism involves a two-tiered process within the Crown Prosecution 
Service that starts with (1) a local resolution process where the 
prosecutorial decision is reviewed by a prosecutor who has not been 
involved with the case. This stage will normally be completed within  
10 days of receipt of the request for review and in the event where the 
complainant remains dissatisfied, (2) the “independent review” will take 
place, which comprises a reconsideration of the evidence and public 
interest element by a reviewing prosecutor independent of the original 
decision, who will look at the case afresh and determine whether it was 
wrong. This second step should take no longer than 30 working days. 
Regardless of outcomes, clear and detailed explanations of the decision 
are offered to the complainant. 
This new mechanism aims at making the process more accountable by 
recognizing that public confidence in the system requires transparency and 
admission of possible errors or abuses of process. Accessibility is a key 
element to this process and does not require any formal legal action or 
legal costs, and is also meant to be quick.  
Arguably, for cases where errors occur, this process can be 
considered a step forward from the Canadian status quo, where decisions 
are partially explained and hardly reviewable due to the high standard of 
abuse of process. Further, the current Canadian review process for abuse 
of process remains costly, which is less so the case for the administrative 
mechanism in England and Wales. 
Another issue with the administrative review mechanism in England 
and Wales is its loosely defined standard of review. By adopting a standard 
of correctness, where mere error can be reviewed, it may arguably give rise 
to the fears expressed by the Court in Anderson, namely, opening the 
process to day-to day review of prosecutorial decisions. 
A compromise between this mechanism and the process available 
prior to Nur, where abuse of process was exceptional, would be to adopt 
a standard of review based on reasonableness, where procedural 
encroachment by prosecutors that would meet the definition of abuse of 
process as defined by Moldaver J., in Nur could be reviewed. 
Such a model can be adopted in Canada for prosecutorial decisions 
that limit freedoms of Aboriginal people, such as the triggering of 
mandatory minimum sentences that reduce sentencing options for 
Aboriginal offenders. This new model of internal review would be a way 
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to ensure that prosecutors take into account the unique circumstances and 
background of Aboriginal offenders by ensuring that prosecutors have 
taken note of this in their file and motivated their decision in this respect.  
Review would only be possible in situations where prosecutors have 
failed to engage with the individual’s Aboriginal background and status — 
in other words by failing to explicitly explain in the file, the ways in which 
the Aboriginal person’s background has been relevant or not in reaching 
the specific prosecutorial decision. This form of review would not be a 
substantive review of the actual decision, but rather of the process itself to 
ensure that prosecutors have explicitly taken into account that person’s 
Aboriginal status and background and highlighted the ways that this has 
impacted or not on their decision. Hence, reviews by interested parties 
would only be possible in cases where prosecutors fail to discuss the 
accused’s Aboriginal status and background in the file and the ways this 
status has impacted on their prosecutorial decision. This form of review 
would limit and control the number of reviews and draw prosecutorial 
attention to Aboriginal status and background without opening the door to 
substantive reviews. It would also enable transparency and understanding 
by facilitating communication by prosecutors of the rationales behind their 
prosecutorial decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, while there are numerous discussions about the role of 
judges in dealing with mandatory minimums, there is less discussion on 
the role and ethical duties that Crown prosecutors should have in a context 
of decision-making, which can restrict individual liberty and exacerbate 
the over-incarceration of Aboriginal people, including the triggering of 
mandatory minimum sentences. This article provides a first step towards 
this reflection. As highlighted by several reports, and more recently by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, the plight of Aboriginal 
over-representation in prisons continues to plague the Canadian criminal 
justice process and to address this situation, all actors of the criminal 
justice process need to recognize their share of responsibility for this 
history of discrimination, including prosecutors. Following this 
recognition, a way forward would be to expand the Gladue principle to all 
actors in the criminal justice process who can limit Aboriginal people’s 
freedoms and contribute to their over-representation in Canadian prisons. 
To achieve these goals, several changes can be made in prosecutorial 
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guidelines to explicitly highlight that prosecutors need to pay special 
consideration to Aboriginal people before making decisions that would 
affect their liberty and find alternatives to imprisonment whenever 
possible. Further, discussions around ways to increase transparency and 
accountability while maintaining some limits to judicial oversight of 
prosecutorial decisions should also be encouraged. Although this piece 
specifically addresses the importance of considering Aboriginal status and 
background in some prosecutorial decisions, there may be other decision-
making contexts in which the Gladue principle should be expanded to 
contribute to a more just and equal process, in light of the history of 
systemic discrimination and abuse of process suffered by Aboriginal 
people in the criminal justice system. 
